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This paper finds support for the existence of a political resource curse. 
It draws on improved quality data from the International Centre for Tax and 
Development’s Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD) to re-examine 
existing econometric tests and significantly improve their robustness.
The challenge, and benefits 
of the ICTD Government 
Revenue Dataset
Most previous studies into the political 
resource curse find that governments that 
rely more heavily on revenue from natural 
resources are less likely to be democratic 
and accountable to citizens. But they 
have relied on data relating to the total 
value of natural resource production or 
“resource income”. These fail to capture 
the key relationship of interest, namely 
the impact on political outcomes of the 
composition of government revenue from 
tax and non-tax sources respectively. Use 
of the ICTD GRD makes it possible to 
distinguish consistently between tax revenue 
excluding revenue from natural resource 
production (a proxy for revenue that has to 
be “earned” by bargaining with citizens); 
and non-tax revenue (dominated by natural 
resource revenue but including other forms 
of non-tax revenue, for example from 
state enterprises). This closely equates to 
“unearned” income. 
The GRD thus provides data that captures 
the key theoretical propositions underpinning 
the political resource curse, including two 
distinct but related causal mechanisms:
i) Governments heavily dependent on tax 
revenue are expected to need to bargain 
with mobile taxpayers, leading to greater 
accountability and democracy.
ii) Governments with access to non-tax 
revenue, primarily from natural resources, 
are more autonomous from citizens, and 
empowered to resist political opposition 
through repression or expanded public 
spending and patronage.
The GRD makes it possible to identify 
the proportion of resource income that 
governments are able to capture as revenue 
and use for repression or patronage.
The ICTD Research: 
approach and methodology
Using the GRD, this research tests the 
relationship between democracy (the 
dependent variable) and three measures of 
government revenue, namely:
i) Variable 1: total tax collection excluding 
resource revenue as a share of GDP.
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ii) Variable 2: total non-tax revenue as a 
share of GDP.
iii) Variable 3: combines i) and ii) to produce 
a measure of tax reliance (the share 
of non-resource tax revenue in total 
government revenue).
The research focuses on the extent of 
non-tax revenue in relation to other sources 
of revenue and the overall size of the 
economy, on the premise that the impact 
on incentives and behaviour of political 
leaders and citizens depends on the relative 
rather than the absolute size of resource 
revenue. It looks first at simple cross country 
correlations between democracy and 
the three alternative revenue measures: 
these show that countries that are more 
reliant on tax revenue and less reliant 
on non-tax revenue tend to be more 
accountable. It then moves beyond simple 
correlations, applying GRD data to several 
alternative econometric models that draw 
on the existing literature. The first two offer 
complementary approaches to estimating 
the relationship between the composition 
of government revenue and continuous 
measures of democracy, controlling for 
national income per capita, the occurrence 
of violent conflict, and regional diffusion of 
democracy. The third approach focuses on 
the impact of the composition of government 
revenue on the likelihood of transition from 
autocracy to democracy, or from democracy 
to autocracy. 
Results
Overall, the research finds strong evidence 
for the existence of a political resource 
curse. Across the vast majority of tests it 
finds both a statistically positive relationship 
between tax reliance and democracy, and 
a statistically negative relationship between 
non-tax revenue (predominantly from natural 
resources) and democracy. The broad 
results are robust to alternative control 
variables and measures of democracy. 
Moreover, increased non-tax revenue and 
decreased tax reliance have a very large 
impact on the likelihood that a country will 
transition to, or remain, a democracy.  The 
likelihood of a democratic transition is three 
times larger in a country with low levels of 
non-tax revenue as compared to countries 
with 10% or more of GDP from non-tax 
revenue.
However, results are sensitive to alternative 
econometric models and changes in 
specification. This is particularly the case 
for results relating to total tax collected 
exclusive of resource revenue. This variable 
tends towards having a positive impact 
on democracy but ranges from positive 
to negative significance, while most often 
being insignificant. This may indicate that 
tax revenue has little consistent impact on 
levels of democracy, or (quite plausibly) 
that the relation between taxation and 
democracy is complex and non-linear, and 
not adequately captured in the models. 
For example, any impact of taxation on 
democracy may occur over the long term, 
through subtle changes in the levels of 
political engagement among increasingly 
burdened taxpayers.
Implications for policy and 
research
The evidence for a political resource 
curse is robust and the effects are large. 
Policymakers concerned to increase 
accountable governance need to pay 
attention to the composition of government 
revenue, and be realistic about the 
likelihood of a democratic transition in 
countries heavily dependent on non-tax 
revenue. They must also be alert to the 
governance risks posed by discoveries of 
oil in low income countries, especially the 
risks of reduced tax reliance in democracies 
where tax collection is already weak. Links 
between democracy and increased tax and 
tax reliance are by no means automatic: 
policymakers need to pay attention to how 
complex relationships between government 
and taxpayers play out over time, and in a 
particular context. Researchers need to pair 
cross-country econometric modeling with 
evidence from alternative, complementary 
research strategies.
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